Categorization and identification decision processes were examined and compared in 4 separate experiments. In all tasks, the critical stimulus component was a line that varied across trials in length and orientation, and the optimal decision rules were always complex piecewise quadratic functions. Evidence was found that identification is mediated by separate explicit and implicit systems. In addition, a common type of suboptimaliry was found in both categorization and identification. In particular, observers apparently approximated the piecewise quadratic functions of the optimal decision rules with simpler piecewise linear functions. A computational model, which was motivated by a recent neuropsychological theory of category learning, successfully accounted for this suboptimal performance in both categorization and identification. The model assigns a key role to the striatum and assumes the observed suboptimality was largely due to massive convergence of visual cortical cells onto single striatal units.
Categorization and identification decision processes were examined and compared in 4 separate experiments. In all tasks, the critical stimulus component was a line that varied across trials in length and orientation, and the optimal decision rules were always complex piecewise quadratic functions. Evidence was found that identification is mediated by separate explicit and implicit systems. In addition, a common type of suboptimaliry was found in both categorization and identification. In particular, observers apparently approximated the piecewise quadratic functions of the optimal decision rules with simpler piecewise linear functions. A computational model, which was motivated by a recent neuropsychological theory of category learning, successfully accounted for this suboptimal performance in both categorization and identification. The model assigns a key role to the striatum and assumes the observed suboptimality was largely due to massive convergence of visual cortical cells onto single striatal units.
Is the plant edible or poisonous? Is the person a friend or a foe? Was the sound made by a predator or by the wind? All organisms assign objects and events in the environment into separate classes or categories. If they did not, they would die, and their species would become extinct. Therefore, categorization is among the most important decision tasks performed by organisms (Ashby & Lee, 1993) .
There is much recent evidence that in humans, category learning relies on multiple systems (e.g., Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Pickering, 1997;  E. E. Smith, Patalano, & Jonides, 1998; E. E. Smith, Patalano, Jonides, & Koeppe, 1996; Waldron & Ashby, in press ). The consensus is that one system is explicit (i.e., rule or theory based) and that at least one involves some form of implicit learning (i.e., the details are not accessible to conscious awareness). Ashby and Waldron (1999) presented evidence consistent with the general notion that the implicit system gradually learns to associate response labels with clumps of cells in some high-level visualrepresentation area, such as inferotemporal cortex. Following the work of , they argued that the striatum (i.e., consisting of the putamen and the caudate nucleus) 1 , which is the input structure within the basal ganglia, is particularly well suited for learning such stimulus-response associations. For example, there are recent reports that patients with striatal dysfunction F. Gregory Ashby, Department of Psychology, University of California at Santa Barbara; Elliott M. Waldron, Seattle, Washington; W. William Lee, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Amelia Berkman, Santa Barbara, California. This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grants SBR95-14427 and BCS99-75037.
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(including those with either Parkinson's or Huntington's disease) are impaired in category learning (e.g., Filoteo, Maddox, & Davis, 1998; Knowlton, Mangels, & Squire, 1996; . In addition, lesions of the caudate nucleus in rats and monkeys have been shown to disrupt simple forms of category learning (e.g., Divac, Rosvold, & Szwarcbart, 1967; McDonald & White, 1993 Packard, Hirsch, & White, 1989; Packard & McGaugh, 1992; Wang, Ainger, & Mishkin, 1991 , as cited in Petri & Mishkin, 1994) , and there is substantial evidence that the striatum plays a key role in procedural learning (e.g., Hikosaka et al., 1999; Jahanshahi, Brown, & Marsden, 1992; Mishkin, Malamut, & Bachevalier, 1984; Saint-Cyr, Taylor, & Lang, 1988; Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1989) .
Neuroanatomical data support this general model. First, the striatum receives projections from virtually all areas of the neocortex including extrastriate visual-cortical areas (Saint-Cyr, Ungerleider, & Desimone, 1990) . These projections are known to be both diffuse and highly convergent in the sense that many cortical afferents converge on relatively few striatal units and that any single cortical afferent makes contact with many striatal units. Second, the striatum is an area with a high degree of synaptic plasticity, much of which is mediated by dopaminergic projections from the substantia nigra (pars compacta) that fire selectively in the presence of unexpected reward (Schultz, Apicella, & Ljungberg, 1993; Stein & Belluzi, 1989; Wickens, 1993) . Further, the basal ganglia are known to have prominent projections to prefrontal cortex and motor output areas (i.e., via the thalamus; see, e.g., Alexander, DeLong, & Strick, 1986) . On the basis of the above evidence, it has been suggested that the basal ganglia function to associate a particular pattern of cortical activation with a motor response (e.g., Rolls, 1994; Wickens, 1993) . Together, the neuropsychological and anatomical data suggest that the corticalstriatal-cortical system may be a good candidate for the neural substrate of at least one form of implicit perceptual classification (see , for a much more thorough discussion of these data). Ashby and Waldron (1999) proposed a relatively simple model of visual-pattern classification that is consistent with these data. First, they assumed that stimuli are represented in a "perceptual space" somewhere in higher level visual areas, such as inferotemporal cortex. It has been estimated that as many as 10,000 cells in visual cortex project to the same striatal cell (i.e., in the tail of the caudate nucleus; e.g., Wickens, 1993) . Because of this convergence, Ashby and Waldron proposed that a low-resolution map of perceptual space is represented among the striatal units. Through learning, the striatal units become associated with one of the category labels 2 so that after learning is complete, a category response label is associated with each of a number of different regions of perceptual space. In effect, the striatum has associated a response with clumps of cells in visual cortex. Ashby and Waldron (1999) 
called this model the striatal pattern classifier (SPC).
A simplified version of the SPC is illustrated in Figure 1 for a category-learning experiment in which each stimulus is a line that varies across trials in length and orientation. Figure la shows the design of a hypothetical experiment. Each point describes a different stimulus. The plus signs indicate the lengths and orientations of the exemplars of Category B, and the dots describe the exemplars of Category A. On each trial, one of these stimuli is sampled randomly and presented to the observer, whose task is to assign it to Category A or B. Feedback about response accuracy is given on every trial. The curve in Figure la is called the optimal decision bound because it describes the optimal response strategy-that is, accuracy is maximized if the observer responds A to any stimulus that falls below the optimal bound and B to any stimulus that falls above. A large literature shows that healthy young adults often eventually learn to respond in a nearly optimal fashion in experiments like the one shown in Figure la (e.g., Ashby & Gott, 1988; Ashby & Maddox, 1990 Maddox & Ashby, 1993) . The two-dimensional length-orientation space in Figure Ib depicts the perceptual representation of the lines used in the Figure la experiment. Thus, small regions in this space are associated with a distinct cell in some extrastriate visual area (i.e., the cell maximally stimulated when a particular stimulus is shown). The four large dots represent four different striatal units. Each striatal unit is associated with one of the two category responses, which creates four distinct regions in perceptual space. In Figure Ib , two of those regions are associated with Category A, and two are associated with Category B.
In Figure 1 , the SPC is able to mimic the optimal (quadratic) bound with only four striatal grid points. However, it is clear that with these same four points, the model would predict suboptimal performance in a task in which the optimal bound was much more complex than the one shown in Figure 1 . In fact, because the SPC assumes coarse coding among the striatal grid points, it makes the robust prediction that when the optimal decision boundaries become sufficiently complex, suboptimal performance should result. This prediction sharply contrasts with the popular exemplar mod- els of categorization (e.g., Nosofsky's 1986 generalized-contrast model) , which predict that as observers gain experience their performance should converge to optimal, no matter how complex the category structures 3 (Ashby & Alfonso-Reese, 1995) . Few studies in the literature have tested this important difference between the models. In a notable exception, McKinley and Nosofsky (1995, Experiment 2) found suboptimal performance in a task in which the optimal decision bound was considerably more complex than the quadratic curve of Figure 1. 2 At this point, there is insufficient data to postulate whether each striatal unit becomes associated with an abstract category label (which, presumably, is represented in prefrontal cortex) or with a motor response (represented in premotor or motor cortex). Current neuroanatomy is consistent with either hypothesis. We are currently completing experiments to test between these alternatives. 3 The only requirements are that the observer does not completely ignore any relevant stimulus dimensions and that overall stimulus discriminability gradually increases with experience (see Ashby & Alfonso-Reese, 1995 , for more details). The first part of this article examines the ability of people to learn highly complex category bounds. In Experiment 1, observers were asked to learn four categories (of the Figure 1 lines) in which the optimal bound separating each pair of categories was quadratic. We show that in this case, observers apparently approximated the quadratic components of the optimal bound with linear pieces, even though in a control condition with only two of the four categories, other observers used quadratic bounds.
The second part of this article examines stimulus identification. Technically, identification is a task in which each stimulus has its own unique identifying label. In contrast, many stimuli in a categorization task have the same response label (i.e., the category name). So the stimulus-response mapping is one-to-one in identification and many-to-one in categorization. However, if there is stimulus or perceptual noise, then the percept associated with a stimulus will vary from trial to trial, regardless of whether the task is identification or categorization. In this case, the perceptresponse mapping is many-to-one in both tasks, so the decision problems in identification and categorization are similar (Ashby & Lee, 1993) . Not surprisingly, several studies have shown a close association between identification and categorization behavior (Ashby & Lee, 1991; Maddox & Ashby, 1996; Nosofsky, 1986) .
If identification and categorization are subserved by the same decision processes and if there are multiple systems of category learning, then there must also be multiple systems of identification. To our knowledge, however, this possibility has not been proposed or explored in the identification literature. In the second half of this article, we first develop an identification version of the SPC that includes perceptual noise. Next, in a series of experiments, we present the first evidence that identification performance is also mediated by separate explicit and implicit systems, and we show that the SPC is an excellent model of the implicit identification system.
Complex Categorization
The design of Experiment 1 is illustrated in Figure 2 . The exemplars from the four categories are each illustrated by a different symbol. The decision bounds that maximize categorization accuracy are also shown. Each stimulus was a line that varied across trials in length and orientation. On each trial, one of the stimuli illustrated in Figure 2 was sampled randomly and presented on a CRT. The observer's task was to assign the stimulus to one of the four categories, A, B, C, or D, by pressing the appropriate response key. Observers were told the correct response at the end of each trial. Note that the categories overlap in Figure 2 , so perfect accuracy is impossible. In fact, an observer using the optimal bounds would achieve an accuracy of 90% correct. In addition to the four-category condition shown in Figure 2 , a separate control condition was run in which different observers learned two of the four categories shown in Figure 2 (i.e., Categories A and D) . The optimal accuracy in this twocategory condition was 95%.
Method Observers
Five observers participated in the four-category condition (1 man and 4 women), and 3 different observers participated in the two-category control condition (1 man and 2 women). One of the female observers in the fourcategory condition was an undergraduate, and the other 7 observers were all graduate students from the Psychology Department at the University of California at Santa Barbara. Observers in the four-category condition participated in five 50-min sessions over consecutive days. Observers in the two-category control condition participated in two 50-min sessions over consecutive days.
Stimuli and Apparatus
The stimuli consisted of high-intensity lines varying in length and orientation presented on a black background on a CRT screen. The stimuli were generated from bivariate normal distributions. In the four-category condition, 200 random samples were drawn from four bivariate normal distributions for a total of 800 stimuli. The category distribution parameters used to generate the stimuli are shown in Table 1 . In the two-category control condition, two of the four categories (Categories A and D in Table  1 ) in the four-category condition were used. The stimuli for both conditions are shown in Figure 2 . The optimal accuracy for the four-category condition was 90%, and the accuracy for the two-category condition was 95%. Twenty transfer stimuli were presented during the last session without feedback. In both conditions, the transfer stimuli, which were chosen to be between the best fitting quadratic and linear bounds, allow an alternative test between the best fitting decision bounds used by the observers. Each (line, orientation) pair was converted into a physical stimulus by creating a line of length "line" pixels and orientation of (TT X orientation)/ 510 radians. For example, the sample (150, 160) was used to create a line 150 pixels long, oriented at 160 (w/510) radians. The orientation of stimuli in the four-category condition varied from 1.4 to 1.8 radians, and the visual angle varied from 3° to 3.4°. The orientation of stimuli in the two-category condition varied from 1.48 to 1.85 radians, and the visual angle varied from 3° to 3.3°. The stimuli were displayed on a Mitsubishi Electric Color Display Monitor (Model C-9918NB) in a dimly lit room.
Procedure
The observer's task in the four-category condition (or two-category condition) was to assign each presented stimulus to a category by pressing one of four (or two) buttons labeled A, B, C, and D (or A and B) . Accuracy was stressed more than speed. The display was either response terminated or terminated after 5 s. After each response, auditory feedback was presented in the form of a sinusoidal tone. A 500-Hz tone indicated a correct response, and a 200-Hz tone indicated an incorrect response. The time between the response and the presentation of the next stimulus was 3 s. Between each consecutive 50-trial block, observers were allowed to rest an amount of time that was observer controlled. An experimental session included 16 blocks of 50 trials in the four-category condition and 8 blocks of 50 trials in the two-category condition. Observers were instructed that on a given trial, the stimulus was equally likely to be a member of any of the categories. Further, observers were instructed that the categories overlapped such that the best accuracy anyone could achieve would be 90% in the four-category condition and 95% in the two-category condition.
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Results
Accuracy Analyses
The responses of typical observers during the last experimental session in both the four-and two-category conditions are shown in Figure 3 . Note that responding was more variable and more clearly suboptimal in the four-category condition than in the two-category condition. The average percentage correct for all 5 observers in the four-category condition during the final session was 67%. In contrast, the average accuracy of the 3 observers in the twocategory control condition was 81.8%. Given that optimal accuracy was 90% in the four-category condition and 95% in the two-category condition, the large accuracy difference across conditions supports the hypothesis that the observers used a more suboptimal decision strategy in the four-category condition than in the two-category condition.
Theoretical Analyses
To get a more detailed description of how observers categorized the stimuli, the SPC (Ashby & Waldron, 1999) and a number of different decision bound models (Ashby, 1992; Maddox & Ashby, 1993) were fit to each observer's responses. Decision bound models (Ashby & Lee, 1991 Ashby, Lee, & Balakrishnan, 1992; Ashby & Pen-in, 1988 ) are derived from general recognition theory (GRT; Ashby & Townsend, 1986) , which is a multivariate generalization of signal-detection theory (e.g., Green & Swets, 1966) . The fundamental assumption of GRT is that there is trial-by-trial variability in the perceptual information obtained from every stimulus, no matter what the viewing conditions (for a more thorough discussion of this assumption, see Ashby & Lee, 1993) . On each trial, it is assumed that the percept can be represented as a point in a multidimensional psychological space. Decision bound theory assumes that each observer partitions the perceptual space into response regions by constructing a decision bound. On each trial, the observer determines which region the percept is in and then emits the associated response. Despite this deterministic decision rule, decision bound models predict probabilistic responding because of trial-by-trial perceptual and criterial noise. The goal of the analyses reported in this section is to obtain the best possible description of the data from each individual observer. For example, these analyses will allow us to determine whether the data are best fit by a model that assumes a decision bound of the same complexity as the optimal bound or by one that assumes a decision process of less complexity than the optimal bound. We assume that the number of parameters needed to describe the decision bound increases with the complexity of the decision process. For example, according to this logic, data that are best fit by a model with a quadratic decision bound indicate a more complex decision process than data that are best fit by a model with a linear decision bound.
The different models can be divided into two categoriesdepending on whether they assume an explicit or implicit decision strategy. We adopt the operational definition of and define an explicit strategy as one that is easy to verbalize and an implicit strategy as one that is difficult or impossible to describe verbally. The following models were fit to each observer's responses (see Ashby, 1992; Maddox & Ashby, 1993; and Ashby & Waldron, 1999 , for a more formal treatment of these models).
Explicit rules. The following models assumed observers used an explicit decision strategy.
1. The decisional separability model. With the category structure shown in Figure 2 , the most plausible explicit decision strategy is for the observer to set a criterion on each perceptual dimension and then make explicit decisions about the level of the stimulus on each dimension (Ashby & Gott, 1988; Shaw, 1982) . For example, with the stimuli used in Experiment 1, the observer might first decide whether the length was small or large and then whether the orientation was small or large. A different category response is then assigned to each of the four possible outcomes of these decisions. This explicit process produces decision bounds that satisfy a property that Ashby and Townsend (1986) called decisional separability (DS), and that are always parallel to the coordinate axes. The DS model has three free parameters: a decision criterion on each dimension and the variance of internal (perceptual and criterial) noise (i.e., a 2 ). 2. The exclusive-or model. In the two-category condition, the DS model is nonsensical (because there are only two contrasting categories). Instead, the most plausible explicit decision strategy is the following exclusive-or rule:
Respond A if length and orientation are both small or if length and orientation are both large; otherwise respond B.
This model has three parameters: a criterion on both dimensions and a-2 . Implicit rules. The following models assumed an implicit decision strategy.
1. The optimal classifier. The optimal classifier (OC) assumes that observers use the decision bound that maximizes accuracy. In the four-category condition, the decision bound of the OC is piecewise quadratic, and in the two-category condition it is quadratic. The only free parameter of this model is the variance of internal (perceptual and criterial) noise (i.e., a 2 ). 2. The general quadratic classifier. The general quadratic classifier (GQC) assumes that the decision bound between each pair of categories is quadratic. The GQC has six parameters (five bound parameters and <r 2 ) in the two-category case and 21 parameters (20 bound parameters and <r 2 ) in the four-category case (see Ennis & Ashby, 2000 , for a detailed description of how the GQC was fit).
3. The SPC. A total of three different versions of the SPC were fit, which differed according to the number of free striatal grid points that were assumed. In the simplest version, the grid points were fixed at the category means. This model is equivalent to the minimum-distance classifier, which assumes the observer responds with the category that has the nearest (i.e., most similar) mean. If the category means are interpreted as category prototypes, then this version of the SPC is also equivalent to a simple prototype model (e.g., Ashby & Maddox, 1998; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Reed, 1972) . In any case, this model has only one free parameter (i.e., cr 2 ). A second version of the SPC also assumed one grid point per category but allowed the locations of these points to be free parameters. In this model, the decision boundaries that emerge are linear in the two-category condition and piecewise linear in the four-category condition. This model is equivalent to the general linear classifier, which assumes that the bound between any pair of categories is a line of arbitrary slope and intercept. With two categories, the model has three free parameters (including <r 2 ), and with four categories, it has seven parameters. The third version of the SPC assumed two grid points per category. In this model, the bound between each pair of categories is piecewise linear.
Model fits. These models were fit to the data using an iterative search routine that minimized the sum of squared errors (SSE) between the observed responses and the predicted probabilities of the observed responses. Some of the models are nested, and in this case, it is possible to test whether the extra parameters of the more general model lead to a significant improvement in fit over the more restricted version. Let SSE T and SSE g refer to the SSE of the more restricted and general model, respectively, where the restricted model is a special case of the more general model. Let df r and df g refer to the degrees of freedom associated with each model. Then, under the null hypothesis that the restricted model is correct, the statistic
has an approximate F distribution with df t -df g degrees of freedom in the numerator and df g degrees of freedom in the denominator (e.g., Khuri & Cornell, 1987) . Table 2 shows the SSE for all models fit to the four-category data for all 5 observers. First, note that the DS model fit worst for every observer, supporting the hypothesis that none of the observers used explicit rules. Second, of the two one-parameter models, the (fixed-point) SPC always fit substantially better than the optimal model. This is important because the (fixed-point) SPC assumes piecewise linear bounds, whereas the optimal model assumes piecewise quadratic bounds. Finally, note that statistical tests strongly favor the four-point SPC over the GQC for every observer (i.e., p < .01). Again, the model assuming piecewise linear bounds was favored over the model assuming piecewise quadratic bounds. Figure 4 shows the estimated decision bounds from the best fitting version of the GQC. Note that these are very nearly piecewise linear. The GQC is the most flexible of the models fit to these data. It has the ability to produce piecewise quadratic bounds of extreme curvature. Nevertheless, for every observer, the best fit occurred with simple piecewise linear bounds. In fact, the GQC bounds in Figure 4 are almost indistinguishable from the bounds of the best fitting version of the four-point SPC. Thus, the GQC fit best when it mimicked the piecewise linear bounds of the SPC. These results provide strong evidence that observers in this experiment responded suboptimally and that they approximated the optimal piecewise quadratic bounds with decision regions that were partitioned by simpler piecewise linear bounds. Table 3 shows the fit values for the two-category control data. Observer 1 may have been using an explicit strategy, but the data of Observers 2 and 3 were clearly best fit by the GQC. 4 Most important, for all 3 observers, the GQC fit significantly better than the version of the SPC that had one (free) grid point per category (p < .01). This replicates results of several experiments reported by Ashby and Maddox (1992; Maddox & Ashby, 1993) ; that is, with two categories, when the optimal decision bound is quadratic, the performance of experienced observers is described better by quadratic bounds than by linear bounds.
In conclusion, these results suggest that there is some upper level on the total complexity of the decision bounds that people can learn (at least in any reasonable amount of time). The control condition and a number of similar previously published studies suggest that this level is greater than that of a single quadratic curve, whereas the four-category data suggest it is less than the complex piecewise quadratic curves shown in Figure 2 . Our results also support the hypothesis that when the complexity of a set of optimal bounds exceeds this threshold, people respond as if using simpler bounds that roughly approximate the optimal bounds. In the present experiment, this entailed substituting piecewise linear bounds for the optimal piecewise quadratic bounds. An efficient way of formalizing these conclusions is via the SPC, which also has the advantage of neuropsychological plausibility.
Stimulus Identification
As mentioned above, identification is similar to categorization because in both tasks, observers are asked to respond to a single stimulus. The only difference is that in identification, each stimulus has a unique response, whereas in categorization, at least two stimuli have the same response. If there is stimulus or perceptual noise, however, then from the perspective of the decision process, the two tasks are identical (Ashby & Lee, 1993) . There is also some evidence 4 Although at first it may seem counterintuitive, the exclusive-or model is a special case of the GQC, so the F test described in the text is valid. Let x denote perceived orientation and y denote perceived length. Then the decision rule of the exclusive-or model is equivalent to the following:
Respond A if (x -x a )(y -y a ) > 0; otherwise respond B, for constants x a and y 0 . Expanding the left side yields the following rule: Respond A if xy -y a x -x a y + x a y, > 0; otherwise respond B. The equation on the left describes an hyperbola, which is a special kind of quadratic curve.
To double check the conclusions of these F tests, we refit the GQC and the exclusive-or model using maximum-likelihood estimation. The fits of the models can then be compared using the AIC statistic (e.g., Akaike, 1974; Takane & Shibayama, 1992) . This test favored the GQC for all observers, although the GQC advantage for Observer 1 was very small. that at least some of the same neural structures mediate both identification and category learning. For example, many of the animal lesion studies mentioned above that support a role of the striatum in perceptual classification actually used identification paradigms. For example, several studies have shown that lesions to the (tail of the) caudate nucleus impair the learning ability of rats in two-stimulus (visual) identification tasks (e.g., McDonald & White, 1993 Packard et al., 1989; Packard & McGaugh, 1992) . These results suggest that the Experiment 1 findings might generalize to identification tasks. In addition, given the recent interest in multiple systems of category learning, it is of interest to ask whether there are similar multiple systems of stimulus identification. This section explores these questions.
Consider an identification experiment with the n stimuli, S t , S 2 > . . . , S n . Denote the n possible responses that identify each of these stimuli by R,, R 2 , . . . , R n . Data from an identification experiment are cataloged in a confusion matrix containing n rows and n columns. The entry in row i and column j, denoted by Cy, is the frequency with which the observer responded Rj on trials when stimulus Sj was presented. Thus, the entries on the main diagonal (i.e., the c i{ ) are the frequencies of correct responding, and the off-diagonal cells contain the frequencies of the various types of errors (i.e., confusions). The sum of the entries in row i equals the number of trials on which stimulus Sj was presented. This value is determined by the experimenter, so there are n -1 degrees of freedom in each row of a confusion matrix, for a total of n(n -1) degrees of freedom overall.
A confusion matrix from a single observer in an experiment that used the stimuli illustrated in Figure 5 (reported by Ashby & Lee, 1991) is shown in Table 4 . Note its complex structure. First, it is highly asymmetric. For example, the observer responded R 9 on trials when stimulus S g was presented 41 times but responded R 8 on trials when stimulus S 9 was presented only 3 times. Second, the correct response is not always the most frequent response. For example, when stimulus S 4 was presented, R 4 was only the third most frequent response. Data such as this require a sophisticated and powerful model. For example, a common practice is to interpret an identification confusion matrix as proximity data and use it as input to multidimensional scaling routines (e.g., Kruskal & Wish, 1978) . However, multidimensional scaling provides a poor model for the data presented in Table 4 because the multidimensional scaling model assumes symmetry and minimality (i.e., that the largest entry in each row is on the main diagonal).
Our strategy for studying decision processes in identification is to develop and test a wide variety of identification models. Included in this list are the SPC and the same decision-bound models that were described in the last section. The models were tested on data from three experiments that used a similar procedure and stimulus set. All together, six confusion matrices were analyzed, and each matrix came from data for a single observer who participated in at least 1,500 identification trials. The first data set we examined was collected by Ashby and Lee (1991) . The stimuli, which are illustrated in Figure 5 , were semicircles with a radial line that varied in size and in orientation of the radial line. The nine stimuli were created by factorially combining three sizes and three orientations. We now describe the various models that were tested. 
Models of Stimulus Identification The Similarity-Choice Model
The most widely known model of identification data is the similarity-choice model (also known as the biased-choice model). It was originally proposed by Shepard (1957) and Luce (1963) , so it is sometimes called the Luce-Shepard choice model. The similarity-choice model assumes that the probability of responding RJ on trials when stimulus S^ is presented equals the following:
( 1) where rjy is the similarity between 5, and Sj and /3j is the bias toward response R 3 (without loss of generality, one can set T} H = 1 for all values of < and 2/3,. = 1).
The similarity-choice model has had remarkable success. For many years, it was the standard against which competing models were compared. As recently as 1992, J. E. K. Smith summarized its performance by concluding that the similarity-choice model "has never had a serious competitor as a model of identification data. Even when it has provided a poor model of such data, other models have done even less well" (p. 199). Even so, the model was never considered completely satisfactory. The main problem is that a good fit of the model provides little insight into the psychological processes of the observer producing the data. The model merely says that the probability of confusing Sj for S i is proportional to the product of the similarity between the two stimuli and the Rr esponse bias (the denominator in Equation 1 is just a normalizing constant). Also, the model does not say how a decision is reached. Equation 1 only predicts the proportion of R^ responses to expect over the course of a large number of 5j trials. An ideal model of stimulus identification would provide fits that are as good or better than the similarity-choice model and at the same time provide insight into the underlying perceptual and decisional processes.
Decision-Bound Models
As mentioned above, decision-bound models were derived from GRT, a multivariate generalization of signal detection theory that assumes there is trial-by-trial variability in the perceptual information obtained from every stimulus. On each trial, it is assumed that the percept can be represented as a point in a multidimensional psychological space. Thus, over the course of an experiment, the collection of all possible percepts associated with a stimulus are represented by a multivariate probability distribution. All models in this article assume multivariate normal distributions. Figure 6 shows an example of a GRT representation of the perceptual information associated with the nine stimuli illustrated in Figure 5 . Each of the nine ellipses is a contour of equal likelihood from a bivariate normal distribution of percepts. The mean percept is at the center of the contour, and each point on the same contour is an equal number of standard deviation units from the mean. So, for example, the percepts associated with stimulus S 2 have more variability on dimension x l than on dimension jc 2 . A tilted ellipse indicates a perceptual dependence. The perceived values on the two perceptual dimensions are positively correlated on trials when stimulus 5, is presented but are negatively correlated on 5 7 trials. In many identification experiments, the alternative stimuli are highly similar, so errors caused by misperceiving the stimulus are more common than in typical categorization experiments. As a result, more detailed models of the perceptual representation are needed when modeling identification confusion matrices than are needed to model typical categorization data. Figure 6 . An example of a general recognition theory representation of the perceptual information associated with the nine stimuli illustrated in Figure 5 .
As in categorization, decision bound models of identification assume that the observer constructs decision bounds that partition the perceptual space into regions. Each region is associated with a response alternative. On trials in which stimulus S t is presented, the percept is represented as a random sample from the 5; percep tual distribution. The decision process is assumed to determine which region the percept is in and then to emit the associated response. Thus, the probability of responding R^ on S { trials is equal to the probability that a random sample from the S ; percep tual distribution falls in the R^ response region. Computationally, this probability is equal to the proportion of the S { perceptual distribution spilling into the Rj region. In the Figure 6 example, this proportion is equal to (2) P№) = /<*, where/^j], ;t 2 ) is the bivariate normal distribution (i.e., probability density function) of the percepts elicited by stimulus S i( and Oj is the set of all (x,, x 2 ) in the Rj response region. Ennis and Ashby (2000) described a general numerical algorithm that efficiently computes this integral.
Note that the perceptual distributions in Figure 6 are character ized by unique means, variances, and correlations. In addition, Ashby, Ennis, and tested models in which the decision bounds could be arbitrary linear or quadratic functions. They fit this very general decision bound model to a number of different data sets and compared its performance with that of the similarity choice model. In each of these applications, the stimuli had an obvious two dimensional structure, but a number of different stim ulus dimensions were included. These data were collected from experiments with (a) circles that varied in size and orientation of a radial line, (b) squares that varied in size and brightness, (c) red squares that varied in saturation and brightness, (d) parallelograms that varied in length and width, and (e) colored rectangles that varied in shape and saturation. The results are summarized in Figure 7 .
The goodness of fit measure in these applications was the sum of squared deviations between the observed and predicted response frequencies (SSE). Each point in Figure 7 represents several thousand trials of data collected from a single observer. The abscissa is the SSE from the best fitting similarity-choice model, and the ordinate is the SSE from the best fitting decision-bound model.
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Points on the main diagonal represent equal fits by the two models, points above the diagonal represent a superior fit by the similaritychoice model, and points below the diagonal represent a better fit by the decision-bound model. The results strongly favor the decision-bound model over the similarity-choice model. The SSE goodness-of-fit measure does not penalize a model for extra free parameters, and in all these cases, the similarity-choice model and the decision-bound model had a different number of parameters. Nevertheless, in most of the applications (i.e., 12 of 18), the decision bound model had 72 fewer free parameters than the similarity-choice model, yet it still almost always fit better. We believe these results indicate that at least when the stimuli have an obvious dimensional structure, the decision-bound model is at least as good as and possibly superior to the similarity-choice model at accounting for the confusions observers make in stimulus identification experiments.
As was the case with categorization, the decision bound models of identification can be classified according to whether they assume explicit or implicit decision rules.
Explicit rules. The following models assumed an explicit decision process.
1. The DS model. When the stimuli are arranged in a 3 X 3 factorial structure (e.g., Figure 5 ), the DS strategy described above has the observer set two criteria on each perceptual dimension and then make explicit decisions about the level of the stimulus on each dimension (Ashby & Gott, 1988; Shaw, 1982) . For example, with the stimuli illustrated in Figure 5 , the observer might first decide whether the size was small, medium, or large and then whether the orientation was small, medium, or large. As with categorization, DS bounds, which are illustrated in Figure 8a , are always parallel to the coordinate axes.
Note that all points falling on the leftmost vertical bound, denoted h lt satisfy an equation of the following form:
where the constant c l is the Jtj-intercept. The function Jij(jc 1( x 2 ) has the property that for any point (*,, x 2 ) to the left of the ft, bound, hi(x lt Jt 2 ) < 0, and for any point to the right of the h t bound, /!](*,, x 2 ) > 0. The function h^x^ x 2 ), therefore, discriminates between points to the right and left of the h^ bound and so is called a discriminant function. The other three bounds illustrated in Figure 8a can be used to create discriminant functions /i 2 , h 3 , and h 4 , each with the property that for all points on the same side 5 The best fitting model is found through an iterative search procedure that estimates the values of the unknown free parameters that minimize SSE. In an identification experiment with n stimuli, the similarity-choice model has \An(n + 1) -1 free parameters (Townsend, 1971) . With two perceptual dimensions, the decision-bound model uses five free parameters to describe the perceptual representation of each stimulus (two means, two variances, and a covariance) and a number of free parameters to describe the decision bounds. Depending on the nature of the decision bounds, as many as six distributional parameters can be arbitrarily set to some prespecified values (Ennis & Ashby, 2000) . of the bound as the point (0,0), h-fa, x 2 ) < 0 (for i = 2, 3, or 4), whereas for all points on the other side of the bound, h^ ,x 2 )>0. When the discriminant functions are defined in this way, the decision bounds illustrated in Figure 8a are consistent with the following decision rule:
Respond R, if h,(x t , x 2 ) < 0, H 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) < 0, h 3 (x t , x 2 ) < 0, and h 4 (x!, x 2 ) < 0;
Respond R 9 if /Zi(xi, X 2 ) > 0, h 2 (x i , x 2 ) > 0, A 3 (x,, x 2 ) > 0, and fc 4 (jt|, x 2 ) > 0. (4) Note that each of these subrules is easy to verbalize. For example, the first subrule is equivalent to Respond R, if size and orientation are both small, and the second subrule is equivalent to Respond R 2 if orientation is medium and size is small. Therefore, the decision rule of the DS model is explicit, so we only expect good fits of this model in situations in which the explicit system is expected to dominate identification performance.
2. The DS S model. A slightly more complex strategy is to use an explicit rule but to allow the criteria used for the second decision to depend on the outcome of the first decision. For example, in Figure 8b , the observer first decides whether the size (represented on the ordinate) is small, medium, or large and then whether orientation is small, medium, or large. But the criteria for judging orientation depend on the outcome of the size judgment. This is a useful strategy if perceived size does not depend on orientation but perceived orientation increases with size. In the Figure 8b model, DS holds only for the size dimension. Consequently, we call this the DS S model.
Implicit rules. The following models assumed an implicit decision strategy.
1. The general linear and general quadratic factorial models. The DS and DS S models make sense only if the stimuli have a factorial structure because they divide the perceptual space into a kind of tic-tac-toe pattern. As a consequence, we call these factorial decision-bound models. This class can be generalized by relaxing the requirement that the functions that partition the perceptual space into a tic-tac-toe pattern are vertical and horizontal line segments. For example, the models illustrated in Figures 8c  and 8d are like the DS model in the sense that four bounds partition the space into nine response regions. However, in the linear factorial model (Figure 8c ), each bound is a line of arbitrary slope and intercept. Thus, each of the four discriminant functions are of the following form:
for some constants b n , b 2i , and q. In the quadratic factorial model (Figure 8d ), the observer is assumed to use quadratic discriminant functions of the following form:
for constants a n , a 2i , a 3i , b n , b 2i , and c ( . In both models, the constants can be selected so that hfa, x 2 ) < 0 for all points on the (0, 0) side of the bound. Under these conditions, the decision bounds illustrated in Figures 8c and 8d are consistent with the Equation 4 decision rule, 6 where the discriminant functions are of the form specified by Equation 5 or 6. 6 In the linear and quadratic factorial models, it is possible that the vertical-tending decision bounds, h l and h 2 , intersect or that the horizontal tending bounds, & 3 and h 4 , intersect. In this case, there will exist (A^, x 2 ) for which none of the conditions of the Equation 4 decision rule are met, so an ambiguity exists. This problem did not generally arise in the best-fitting versions of either model, but our model-fitting algorithm required a solution. We assumed that if a percept falls in a cross-over region, the observer will decide the discriminant values from the two intersecting bounds are untrustworthy. The two remaining trustworthy bounds allow the observer to eliminate six response alternatives. The observer is assumed to guess among the remaining three alternatives. This strategy augments the Equation 4 decision rule with the following:
Guess among R,, R,, and R, if h t < 0, fc 2 < 0, h 3 < 0, and A 4 > 0; Guess among R,, R 2 , and R 3 if h, < 0, /i 2 > 0, A 3 < 0, and h 4 < 0; Guess among R4, R 5 , and R« if h, < 0, A 2 > 0, & 3 > 0, and h t < 0; Guess among R 7 , R 8 , and R, if h, < 0, ft 2 > 0, h 3 > 0, and h, > 0; Guess among R 2 , R 5 , and R 8 if fc, > 0, A 2 < 0, fc 3 < 0, and h t > 0; Guess among R 3 , Re, and R, if h t > 0, A 2 > 0, h 3 < 0, and A 4 > 0; Guess among all alternatives if/!, < 0, h 2 > 0, ft 3 < 0, and A 4 > 0. Note. SSE = sum of squared errors; AIC = A information criterion; DS = decisional separability; DS S = decisional separability that holds only for the size dimension; SPC = striatal pattern classifier. a The best fitting models for Observers 1 and 2; note that each accounts for 99.6% of variance.
When there are two response alternatives, the linear and quadratic factorial models predict the same decision bounds as the general linear classifier and the GQC described in the categorization section. However, with more than two alternatives, the equivalence breaks down because the general linear classifier and the GQC postulate plausible decision strategies for any stimulus ensemble or any category structures, whereas the factorial models do not.
Although the two DS models and the linear and quadratic factorial models are all consistent with the Equation 4 decision rule, the decision rules of the linear and quadratic factorial models are not explicit because it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to give verbal descriptions of these rules. As such, the linear and quadratic factorial models are models of the implicit system.
2. The OC. The OC assumes that observers use decision bounds that maximize response accuracy. This model is consistent with a process in which observers give the response associated with the greatest likelihood. The bounds that emerge (not shown) are similar to those of the minimum distance classifier, except they are piecewise quadratic rather than piecewise linear.
The SPC
Because of the limited exposure duration used in the identification experiments considered below, we assumed there would be significant trial-by-trial variability in the percept associated with each stimulus. Thus, for applications to these identification experiments, the SPC incorporated the same perceptual representation as the decision bound models. We tested two versions of the SPC. To keep the number of parameters reasonable, both versions assumed only one striatal unit per response. In the first version, the striatal grid points were fixed at the location of the means of the perceptual distributions (equivalent to the minimum distance classifier), and in the second, the locations of the striatal grid points were free parameters. An example of the former model is shown in Figure  8e , and an example of the latter model is shown in Figure 8f . A simpler version of this computational model was first proposed by Braida (1991) . Figure 9 . Parameter estimates of the best-fitting models in Ashby and Lee's (1991) experiment: decision separability for Observer 1 and decisional separability that holds only for the size dimension for Observer 2.
Observer 1 orientation
Observer 2 orientation
Application 1- Ashby and Lee (1991) The first set of data we examined was collected by Ashby and Lee (1991) . As described above, stimuli in this experiment were the nine semicircles shown in Figure 5 . Two observers participated in the experiment. Feedback was provided after every trial. Both observers completed one practice session and four experimental sessions. Each session consisted of 300 trials. Before the first experimental session, a drawing was presented to the observers showing how the stimuli were related in a 3 X 3 factorial configuration; in addition, the response keypad consisted of nine buttons arranged in a 3 X 3 formation that matched the structure of the stimulus ensemble. The confusion matrix for Observer 2 is shown in Table 4 . Please consult Ashby and Lee (1991) for details of the experimental method and for the Observer 1 confusion matrix. Ashby and Lee (1991) fit a number of different decision bound models to these data. They emphasized perceptual processes, however, and fit only DS and DS S decision models.
The results of fitting the models described in the last section to the Ashby and Lee (1991) data are shown in Table 5 . The parameters of the models were estimated using two different statistical methods. The first method used least squares parameter estimation with SSE as the goodness-of-fit measure. As mentioned above, SSE does not correct for differences in the number of free parameters, which sometimes makes it difficult to compare competing models. The second method used maximum-likelihood estimation with A information criterion (AIC) as the goodness-of-fit measure. The AIC statistic penalizes a model for extra free parameters in such a way that the best model is the one with the smallest AIC, regardless of differences in number of parameters and of whether a nested relation exists between competing models (e.g., Akaike, 1974; Takane & Shibayama, 1992) . Table 5 indicates that for both observers, the two best decision bound models were those assuming an explicit decision rule, and for both observers, these explicit rule models outfit the similaritychoice model. In fact, the best fitting explicit rule model accounted for 99.6% of the variance in each observer's data. Figure 9 shows parameter estimates from these models (DS for Observer 1 and DS S for Observer 2). The violations of DS on the orientation dimension for Observer 2 are small, although Table 5 indicates they are significant.
The parameter estimates of the perceptual distributions must be interpreted with caution, especially the estimates of the perceptual variances and correlations. This is because the models we tested have no criterial noise parameters. The explicit rule models assume the observer adopts two response criteria on each perceptual dimension. These values must be stored in memory between trials and then retrieved when a new stimulus is presented. Variability in the memory and retrieval system is called criterial noise (e.g. Wickelgren & Norman, 1966) . Unless criterial noise is explicitly modeled, it gets absorbed into the estimates of the perceptual distributions.
7 Thus, the perceptual distributions in Figure 9 should be considered the distribution of the sum of perceptual and criterial noise.
Note that for both observers, mean perceived orientation tends to increase with size, even when there is no change in physical orientation. This trend is especially evident for Observer 2. On the other hand, perceived size is relatively unaffected by orientation.
With this type of perceptual asymmetry, the DS S decision strategy is especially plausible.
Why would perceived orientation increase with size? One possibility is that the observers used several cues when judging orientation, one of which was the distance from the top of the radial arm to the bottom of the semicircle. This cue is correlated with orientation, but imperfectly. For a constant orientation, the distance to the top of the radial arm increases with size. One advantage of the decision bound models is that such insights into perceptual processing are expected, whereas they are highly unlikely with the similarity-choice model. In summary, these results strongly support the hypothesis that the decision rules used by observers in this experiment were explicit. In addition, the poor performance of the optimal model, relative to the DS models, indicates that the explicit rules used by observers were decidedly suboptimal.
Experiment 2
The preceding analyses indicate that the observers in Ashby and Lee's (1991) experiment used simple explicit rules (i.e., the DS rules). It is possible, however, that they used explicit rules only because they knew of the 3 X 3 stimulus configuration. What if the observers did not know that the stimuli possessed a simple factorial structure? Would they still use explicit rules? Experiment 2 investigates the issue of whether the observers' knowledge of the stimulus configuration affected their decision process. Essentially, it is a replication of Ashby and Lee's (1991) experiment, except that observers were not told of the factorial structure of the stimuli.
In particular, Experiment 2 differed from Ashby and Lee's (1991) experiment in the following ways. First, observers in Experiment 2 were not shown the stimulus configuration before the start of the experiment. Rather, they were simply told that there were nine stimuli that differed along two dimensions. Second, the names of the stimuli were changed from the two-number format used by Ashby and Lee (i.e., 1, 1; 1, 2; 1, 3; 2, 1; 2, 2; 2, 3; 3, 1; 3, 2; and 3, 3) to a single-letter format (i.e., /, D, G, F, A, B, C, H, and E, respectively) . Third, the observers used a standard computer keyboard to make their responses instead of the 3 X 3 keypad used by Ashby and Lee. Finally, the stimuli were somewhat more discriminable (i.e., pairwise similarity was lower) in this experiment than in Ashby and Lee. Discriminability was increased 7 Perceptual and criterial noise are always difficult, and often impossible, to disambiguate, even in models that have separate perceptual and criterial noise parameters (e.g., Ashby, 1992; Wickelgren & Norman, 1966) . Also, little is known about the multivariate distribution of perceptual noise. To see the problem, consider trials in which the observer decides that the stimulus has a small size and a small orientation. In this case, the observer might access only one criterion on each dimension (i.e., the criterion that separates the small and medium response regions). Let C 0 denote this criterion on the orientation dimension, and let C s denote the criterion on the size dimension. It seems possible that across trials, C 0 and C s might have different variances and might even be correlated. If so, then the presence of criterial noise could seriously bias our estimates of the perceptual distributions. The intercept of each decision bound depicted in Figure 9 should be interpreted as an estimate of a mean criterial placement over trials of the experiment. As such, criterial noise will not affect the mean of the estimated perceptual distributions, so at least these parameters can be interpreted safely. because pilot work indicated that lack of knowledge about the stimulus structure made the task considerably more difficult (Lee, 1994) .
One nice feature of this new experiment is that the experimental setting is more natural; that is, in identifying everyday objects, we rarely have knowledge of how the objects are related to each other in the stimulus space. By not telling the observers how the stimuli are arranged, the task is more akin to what we do normally. This way, we were also in a better position to study the decision processes used during natural identification. Townsend, Hu, and Evans (1984) reported an identification experiment with a similar manipulation. Half of the observers were taught to respond by indicating the level of each stimulus component (the feature report group), and the other half were taught to respond with holistic names like vertical, curve, oblique, club, fishhook, and envelope that roughly described how each stimulus looked (the gestalt report group). Townsend et al. found that the gestalt group tended to sample the stimulus features together, more so than the feature group, and the difference between the two groups persisted throughout the whole experiment. Thus, there is empirical evidence that our change in task instructions could alter the observers' identification strategies.
Method
Observers. Two observers participated in this experiment. They were both undergraduate psychology students at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Observer 1 was a man who had never been in a psychophysical experiment. Observer 2 was a woman who had never participated in an identification experiment but who had participated in other experiments that used stimuli similar to the ones used here. Both observers had normal vision, and both received course credit for their participation.
Stimuli and apparatus. The stimulus set was similar to Ashby and Lee's (1991) . It was constructed by factorially combining three sizes (i.e., radii) and three orientations. The radii were 1.25, 1.35, and 1.45 cm; the orientations were 47, 54, and 61 °. The main change was that the stimuli were more discriminable than in Ashby and Lee (1991) . In addition, instead of half circles ( Figure 5 ), full circles were used in this experiment. Average visual angle was about 1°. The stimuli were generated by an IBM-XT computer and displayed on a high-resolution CRT monitor. The experiment took place in a windowless room lit by normal fluorescent lighting. Observers sat approximately 140 cm from the display monitor. The stimulus display was approximately at the observers' eye level.
Procedure. Before the actual trials began, observers were instructed that their task was to learn to identify, as accurately as they could, nine stimuli labeled A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and /. They were told that the stimuli varied along two dimensions: the orientation of the radial line and the size of the circle. The general nature of an identification experiment (i.e., stimulus presentation, response, feedback, etc.) was explained to them. They were instructed to use the standard computer keyboard to make their responses.
At the beginning of every session, there was a warm-up phase in which the stimuli were presented on the display monitor one at a time, for 5 s each, starting with Stimulus A. The name of each stimulus appeared at the bottom of the display.
Each trial began with a fixation dot that appeared in the center of the screen for 500 ms. Next, one of the nine stimuli was selected randomly and then displayed for 250 ms. Observers were allowed up to 10 s. to make a response. As soon as the observer responded, the correct response appeared Note. Fits enclosed by parentheses can be rejected without statistical testing because they are worse than an alternative model that has fewer free parameters. SSE = sum of squared errors; AIC = A information criterion; DS = decisional separability; DS S = decisional separability that holds only for the size dimension; SPC = striatal pattern classifier. "R 2 = 99.9%.
on the screen for 1.5 s. In addition, if the response was correct, a highpitched tone (600 Hz) sounded for 250 ms, and if the response was incorrect, the tone was low pitched (300 Hz). After the feedback, a 2-s pause followed, and then the next trial began.
The observers were informed that we were interested in asymptotic performance and that many sessions would be required before their performance reached asymptote. Each session consisted of 300 trials broken into six blocks of 50 trials. There was a 30-s pause between blocks. Both observers participated in nine sessions.
Results and Discussion
The accuracy of both observers gradually improved over the course of the first six or seven sessions. During the first five sessions, Observer 1 averaged 33% correct, and Observer 2 averaged 43%, whereas during Sessions 6 through 9, they averaged 65% and 66% correct, respectively. Because we were interested in asymptotic performance, the first five sessions were therefore considered practice, and only Sessions 6 through 9 were included in the data analyses. Tables 6 and 7 contain the confusion matrices for both observers based on their performance in Sessions 6 through 9. The model fits are summarized in Table 8 . Because of the higher overall accuracy than in the Ashby and Lee (1991) experiment, maximum-likelihood estimates could not be obtained. Thus, the only goodness-of-fit measure reported is SSE.
Before examining the model fits for each observer in detail, note that the SPC (with free points) produced the lowest SSE for both observers. In fact, for Observer 2, the fit is almost perfect. SSE is the sum of squared deviations between observed and predicted frequencies. There are 81 cells in the data matrix, so an SSE of 11 (Observer 2, SPC) means that the average squared deviation per cell was u /si = 0.136. For Observer 2, the results indicate that the SPC with fixed points outperformed the similarity-choice, the DS, the DS S , the linear factorial, and the quadratic factorial models because its fit is better and it has fewer free parameters than these models. Although the best fit was given by the SPC with free points, this model has many more free parameters than the SPC with fixed points. However, because these two models are nested, the F test described earlier in this article can be used to determine whether the fit of the more general version of the SPC (with free points) is significantly better than that of the more restricted version (the SPC with fixed points 8 ; see Ashby & Lee, 1991; Khuri & Cornell, 1987) . For Observer 2, this test indicates that the SPC fits significantly better when the grid points are free parameters than when they are fixed at the means of the perceptual distributions, F(15, 15) = 5.27, p < .005. More important though, the superior performance of both versions of the SPC for Observer 2 is strong evidence that this observer used an implicit rule, rather than an explicit rule of the type used by the observers in the Ashby and Lee (1991) experiment.
For Observer 1, Table 8 shows that the similarity choice, the linear factorial, and the quadratic factorial models can be rejected because the DS model (SSE = 84) fit as well or better than any of these models, and it has fewer free parameters. In addition, the F test described above indicates that the DS S model fit significantly better than the DS model, F(4, 25) = 2.80, p < .05, and that the SPC with free points fit better than the SPC with fixed points F(15, 15) = 2.91, p < .025. In absolute terms, the best fit was given by the SPC with free points, whereas the second-best fit was by the DS S model. The DS S model has 10 fewer parameters than the SPC, and, unfortunately, it is impossible to tell whether the SPC provided a significantly better fit given these SSE fit values (because the models are not nested).
9 Nevertheless, it is important to point out two observations regarding these fits. First, for the data of Ashby and Lee (1991) , the SPC with fixed points was far worse than either the DS or the DS S model (see Table 5 ); in the present experiment, the fixed-point SPC has "caught up" considerably.
This finding supports the hypothesis that the changes made in the experimental procedure (i.e., instruction, stimulus labels, etc.) produced a change in the observers' decision strategies, particularly for Observer 2. Second, during the experiment, Observer 1 spontaneously (i.e., without being queried) discovered the factorial (3 X 3) structure of the stimuli by the end of the second experimental session (i.e., Session 7). In fact, Observer 1 told the experimenter that he had begun making his responses by deciding whether the sizes and orientations were small, medium, or largeexactly the DS strategy. Thus, this observer may have used an implicit decision rule (i.e., the SPC) before^he discovered the factorial structure and used a simple explicit strategy afterwards. This result suggests that observers might be very flexible at developing and switching strategies for performing the identification task. Figure 10 illustrates the parameter estimates of the best fitting SPC for both observers. The contours for each true perceptual distribution are approximately one standard deviation from the mean, so the striatal grid points are all within two standard deviations of the true means, and most are within one standard deviation. Thus, the implicit system appears to be quite successful at locating the striatal grid points. Because there are differences in variances and correlations among the alternative perceptual distributions, the optimal decision bounds are piecewise quadratic (e.g., Ashby & Gott, 1988) . Thus, the good fits of the SPC support the hypothesis that the observers in Experiment 2 used suboptimal decision strategies.
In summary, these results support the hypothesis that the observers' knowledge of the experimental stimuli affected their decision strategies. Specifically, under more natural conditions, the SPC seems to be an excellent model of the observers' decision processes.
10 This is in sharp contrast to the earlier finding that the DS models were best. Thus, these analyses represent the first evidence that stimulus identification might be mediated by at least two separate systems.
Observer 1 orientation
Observer 2 orientation Figure 10 . Parameter estimates of the best-fitting models (striatal pattern classifier for both observers) in Experiment 2, along with the appropriate response labels.
Experiment 3
Experiment 2 supports the hypothesis that observers use an SPC-like decision process when they have no expectation that the stimuli have some simple structural relationship. This is important because stimuli (or objects) in the natural environment do not have a factorial structure, so it is vital that humans have general-purpose decision strategies that will work for any arbitrary stimulus structure.
This argument suggests that the SPC might be a good model of the general-purpose decision strategy that humans use in natural identification and that the DS models performed well on Ashby and Lee's (1991) data only because observers were aware of the especially simple stimulus structure. In Experiment 2, the generalpurpose strategy began to emerge because the observers were not informed of the simple stimulus structure. If this hypothesis is correct, then the SPC should also do well in nonfactorial experiments in which the stimuli have no obvious structure. Experiment 3 tests this hypothesis.
The only difference between Experiments 2 and 3 was the stimulus ensemble. All other aspects of the methodology were identical. The same observers participated in both experiments. The stimulus ensemble used in Experiment 2 was produced by first selecting three values of orientation and three values of size and then combining the values factorially to generate the nine stimulus coordinates. In Experiment 3, the stimulus structure was not factorial.
10 Experiment 2 differed from the Ashby and Lee (1991) experiment in the knowledge provided to the observers about the stimuli but also in overall stimulus discriminability (which was higher in Experiment 2). Of course, it is logically possible that the differences in strategy we observed could be due to the discriminability difference rather than to the difference in the observers' knowledge of the stimulus relationships. Over the course of many category-learning studies, however, we have found that overall discriminability has very little effect on strategy (i.e., on whether observers use an explicit or implicit strategy), so we believe this latter possibility is unlikely. 
Method
Once the factorial structure is abandoned, there are many choices on how to select nine stimuli from a grid of possible stimulus coordinates. Given the constraints imposed by our graphics equipment and given the acceptable range of visual angles, there were more than 9.2 X 10 1S stimulus ensembles possible. Although an ensemble could be selected simply at random, there is one further constraint to consider. In the natural environment, it seems unlikely that different objects will have exactly the same value on a stimulus dimension. Thus, we selected the stimulus ensemble for Experiment 3 in a pseudorandom fashion under the constraint that none of the coordinates selected had the same value along either stimulus dimension. A detailed description of the technique can be found in Lee (1994) . Because the same observers served in Experiments 2 and 3, the response labels were changed from letters to numbers to minimize possible response interference.
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Results and Discussion
Even though the stimulus ensemble was completely new to the observers, their performance was surprisingly good after only one practice session; identification accuracy on Session 2 was 53% and 65% for Observers 1 and 2, respectively. This was impressive considering that in Experiment 2, the same observers' secondsession accuracies were 24% and 36%. It is likely that the higher accuracy in Experiment 2 was at least partially due to the fact that the observers were already familiar with the task and the procedure. But it is also possible that after completing so many sessions in the first experiment, the observers' perceptual and decisional systems were somehow more adept at processing the circular stimuli. Because they reached asymptotic accuracy so quickly, both observers participated in only five sessions. The first session was considered practice. Tables 9 and 10 contain the confusion matrices for both observers based on their performance in Sessions 2 through 5 (for both observers, Session 5 accuracy was within 3% of Session 2 accuracy).
The similarity-choice model, the optimal decision bound model, and the fixed-point and free-point SPC models were fit to the confusion matrices of both observers.
12 Table 11 summarizes the fits. Note that the SPC with free grid points provided the best absolute fit to both observers' data and accounted for 99.9% of the variance in both cases. This result supports the hypothesis that the SPC effectively models some general-purpose decision strategy that observers use in factorial as well as nonfactorial experiments. In addition, the SPC fit significantly better when the locations of the grid points were free parameters than when they were fixed at the means of the perceptual distributions for Observer 1 and 2, F(15, 15) = 8.26 and 7.26, respectively, p < .0005 for both F values.
Note also that all three models fit Observer 2's data better than Observer 1's. This finding is most likely due to the fact that Observer 2's averaged accuracy over the four experimental sessions was considerably higher than Observer 1's (66.75% vs. 57.50%). When overall accuracy is high, all models tend to fit well. In Experiment 2, the difference in accuracy between observers was small (65.75% versus 64.50% for Observers 1 and 2, respectively) and the models did not show such a drastic preference for one observer over the other (see Table 8 ).
The parameter estimates for the best fitting models for both observers in this experiment are illustrated in Figure 11 . First, note that for Observer 2, the striatal grid points for Stimuli 2 and 5 are superimposed, and the grid points for Stimuli 1, 7, and 9 are almost superimposed, despite the fact that the perceptual distributions for these stimuli are all different. Thus, the parameter estimates from the best fitting SPC suggest that Observer 2 may have been able to recruit only six different striatal units for this task. Observer 1 may have used the same grid point for Stimuli 2 and 5 but was apparently more successful at disambiguating Stimuli 1, 7, and 9. A second related result is that for Observer 1, the striatal grid points are all within one standard deviation of the perceptual means, but for Observer 2, they are only within two standard deviations of the means. A similar pattern of results occurred in Experiment 2 (see Figure 10) ; that is, for Observer 2, the striatal grid points tended to be further from the perceptual means than for Observer 1. Thus, Observer 1 apparently recruited more striatal grid points for this task and positioned those units in stimulus space more effectively than Observer 2. According to the SPC and , this individual difference may have a variety of neuroanatomical bases (e.g., differing degrees of corticalstriatal convergence, poor resolution of response codes in frontalcortical areas), although the most plausible possibility is probably learning-related differences within the basal ganglia. For example, Observer 1 might have had higher brain dopamine levels 13 than Observer 2.
It is interesting to note that despite the poorer performance of Observer 2's decisional system, her overall accuracy was considerably higher than Observer 1's (66.75% vs. 57.50%). The SPC predicts that this difference is due to perceptual processes. Figure 11 shows that for Observer 2, the stimulus representations have less perceptual variability than for Observer 1. Thus, the SPC fits to the Experiment 3 data display a sort of double dissociationObserver 2 has more effective decision processes but less effective perceptual processes. As it turns out, Observer 2 had participated in an earlier, unrelated experiment with a set of similar stimuli. Because of this, Observer 2 participated in 12 more experimental sessions with these stimulus types than Observer 1. The smaller perceptual variances associated with Observer 2 could therefore be due to increased perceptual learning. Besides being an impressive demonstration of the SPC's ability to tease apart perceptual and decision processes, the double dissociation displayed in Figure 11 suggests that perceptual learning and striatal grid learning may be mediated by separate neural systems. This is certainly consistent with our hypothesis that grid learning is mediated within the basal ganglia, because perceptual learning for visual stimuli is currently thought to be mediated within visual cortex (e.g., Gilbert, 1998) .
Summary
Several important conclusions can be drawn from the results of these three identification experiments. First, we found strong evidence of two qualitatively different types of decision strategies. When observers were aware of a factorial structure in the stimulus ensemble, they used simple decision rules that consisted of making separate decisions about the level of the different stimulus components (in Ashby & Lee's, 1991, experiment) . This decision strategy is explicit in the sense that it is easy to describe verbally and all observers were consciously aware of this strategy. However, when the stimuli had no such structure (Experiment 3) and perhaps also when the stimuli unknowingly had a factorial structure (Experiment 2), observers used a much different strategyone that occurs without much awareness and is difficult or impossible to describe verbally. Although there may be a single-system account of these data, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that there are at least two separate systems of stimulus identification.
General Discussion
A comparison of results from the categorization and identification experiments yields a number of interesting similarities. First, the estimates of the perceptual distributions from the identification experiments shown in Figures 9-11 all indicate variance and correlation differences from stimulus to stimulus. Therefore, as was the case with the four-category condition of Experiment 1, the optimal bounds in all identification experiments were piecewise quadratic. Even so, in all three identification experiments and in the four-category condition of Experiment 1, models that assumed linear or piecewise linear bounds outperformed models that assumed quadratic or piecewise quadratic bounds. Thus, in both categorization and identification, we found strong evidence of a fundamental suboptimality in tasks in which the optimal decision bounds were highly complex.
Second, many researchers in the categorization literature have argued that human category learning is subserved by separate explicit and implicit systems (e.g., Brooks, 1978; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Pickering, 1997; Waldron & Ashby, in press ). To our knowledge, this possibility has not been entertained in the identification literature. If this is true, then our results constitute the first reported evidence for separate explicit and implicit identification systems. In addition, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that these separate identification systems are the same explicit and implicit systems that have been assumed to mediate category learning Ashby & Waldron, 1999) . Specifically, the explicit system seems to be accessible to conscious awareness and to engage in an explicit reasoning process that involves something like hypothesis testing or theory construction and testing. According to Ashby and Wal- 
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Note. Fits enclosed by parentheses can be rejected without statistical testing because they are worse than an alternative model that has fewer free parameters. SSE = sum of squared errors; SPC = striatal pattern classifier. "R 2 = 99.9%.
dron, the most important feature of the implicit system is its coarse coding, which results from the 10,000-to-l convergence ratio from visual cortical cells to striatal cells. The SPC is a computational implementation of this coarse-coding hypothesis. Its impressive orientation Figure 11 . Parameter estimates of the best-fitting models (striatal pattern classifier for both observers) in Experiment 3, along with the appropriate response labels.
success at accounting for both categorization and identification data supports this general theory of perceptual decision processes.
